effects of regulation on prices, firms' costs, efficiency and innovation in sectors such as airline, electricity and energy as surveyed by Paul Joskow and Nancy Rose (1989) . Few of these empirical studies rely on the socalled theory of regulation. Regarding the water industry, there is an abundant literature on residential water demand, firms' cost and their efficiency given their public versus private nature. Relying on a model with asymmetric information and a sample of California water utilities, Frank Wolak (1994) assesses the consumer welfare loss due to asymmetric information and shows that the model with asymmetric information provides a superior description of the cost and demand data than the model under perfect information. Analyzing pricing for residential water is an important policy issue as the sector experienced recently price increases. The problem is even more acute in California because of a high residential demand for water coupled with population growth, water scarcity and the probability of severe droughts.
Relying on a new data set of 32 districts in California over 1995-2000, we analyze regulation of private water utilities. For every district, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) chooses a price for water, an access fee per meter and a rate of return on capital to satisfy firm's revenue requirements. We assume that the CPUC is imperfectly informed about firms' labor efficiency. Following David Besanko (1984) and Wolak (1994) , we develop a model in which the firm's capital is used as a screening variable. In particular, the model has the features of a rate-of-return regulation. We show how the rate of return and the access fee can be determined optimally to control firms' rents. We then adopt a structural approach to analyze the data. A multistep estimator allows us to estimate the key parameters of the model. The empirical results show price inelasticity, an income effect, slightly decreasing returns to scale and a concentration of efficient firms. The computation of the optimal rate of return and access fee shows that the CUPC would tend to be cautious by allowing a lower than optimal rate and access fee. Relying on the estimated parameters, a first experiment evaluates the cost of asymmetric information. The price would be significantly lower resulting in a gain of consumer surplus. A second experiment consists in simulating the outcome of an optimal price cap following Farid Gasmi, Mark Kennet, Jean-Jacques A first section briefly presents the data and the regulatory process. A second section introduces the model and the econometric modeling, while a third section is devoted to the empirical results and policy simulations.
I. Data
Class A utilities are serving more than 10,000 residential connections and are required to submit annual reports on their capital stock including water sources and operating costs.
The rate cases provide information on water price, meter price or access fee, rate of return as well as the interest rate on investment paid by the utility. See Wolak (1994) for the regulatory process used by the CUPC. The CUPC is in charge of protecting the consumers' interests by challenging any claim made by utilities through the general rate cases. The CUPC also exercises some control over the utility's capital stock. The important role played by the capital suggests that the regulator uses the utility's capital stock as a sreening variable in the spirit of Besanko (1984) 
II. The Model and Econometric Modeling
We consider a model of regulation under asymmetric information in the spirit of Besanko (1984) . The water plant is privately informed about its labor efficiency or type θ distributed as F (·) on [θ, θ] , where θ (θ) denotes the most (least) efficient firm. The utility chooses a capital level K that is observable. Investing in K costs δK. The variable cost is C(θ, K, q, c ) where q is the demand by consumers and c is a stochastic shock. The demand q(p, d ) is subject to a stochastic shock d . The regulator observes K invested by the utility and decides the price p, the total access fee T and the rate of return on capital R to satisfy the firm's revenue requirement. Because the random shocks are unknown ex ante, the problem is solved in expectation with respect to d and c denoted by E(·). Because the CPUC protects consumers' interests, the regulator's objective is to maximize the consumer surplus
Under asymmetric information, the regulator does not observe
chooses K(θ) and in equilibrium, a firm with type θ is allowed to charge p(K(θ)) ≡ p(θ) and T (K(θ)) ≡ T (θ) and will be entitled to R(K(θ)) ≡ R(θ). The regulatory contract will be of the form [K(θ), p(θ), T (θ), R(θ)]. The regulator maximizes S while satisfying the revenue 
Proposition 1:The optimal rate-of-return regulation contract
Asymmetric information creates a distortion as assessed by the second term of the RHS in the price and capital equations. There is no distortion for the most efficient firm, while we observe higher prices and larger amounts of capital for other firms. The regulator induces the firm to overcapitalize relative to the case of complete information so that the firm self-selects in the desired way. We note the parallel with the Averch-Johnson effect.
The rate of return plays an important role in insuring the incentive compatibility of the mechanism, i.e. leaving rents to firms.
Efficient firms can charge their monopoly prices while less efficient firms are constrained by the cap. The firm's capital is not subject to any distortion.
We adopt a structural approach to estimate the model, i.e. the econometric model is directly derived from the above theoretical model. The error terms are given by the random shocks d and c and θ, which can be interpreted as a term of unobserved heterogeneity.
We follow Perrigne (2002) identification strategy and estimation procedure. The basic idea is to parameterize the structure of the model q(·), C(·) and F (·), while minimizing the assumptions on d and c and exploiting the independence of d and θ. We consider a demand function with constant price elasticity, namely
vector of exogenous variables. We consider a Cobb-Douglas technology, in which the adverse selection variable affects labor efficiency. This gives the variable cost function C(q, θ, c ) =
where p E and p L denote the price for energy and labor, respectively and Z c is a vector of exogenous variables. Homogeneity of degree 1 can be imposed. Regarding the firms' type density, we choose a Gamma density for its flexibility, i.e. f (θ; r, γ) = γ(γθ) r−1 exp(−γθ)/Γ(r), where r is a positive integer and
Given the multiplicative random shocks, it is natural to assume E[exp ( can create a problem of endogeneity, we need to solve the system in p and K given θ. Given the potential measurement error on capital, we prefer to use the price equation. Thus, the econometric model is made of three equations, namely the demand, the cost and the price, while the error terms are d , c and θ. Namely,
is not endogenous because p(θ i ) and θ i is conditionally independent of di .
The parameters to be estimated are 192) . The estimation method is multistep.
Using E(exp( di )|Z i ) = 1, the first step estimates d 0 , d 1 and d 2 using a Nonlinear GMM estimator. Using the orthogonality condition θ i ⊥ di |Z i , the second step estimates β L , β E , β c and β K using a Linear GMM estimator. The third step estimates β 0 + log E P and (r, γ).
Note that (P) provides log p i = ψ(θ i ; β 0 + log E P , r, γ), since the other terms in (P) are either observed or estimated. For r = 1, 2, . . ., a Method of Simulated Moments is used to estimate (β 0 + log E P , γ). The computation of additional moments allows us to assess the best adjustment for r. Using these estimates, we can recover θ i , i = 1, . . . , 192 from (P).
4

III. Estimation Results and Policy Experiments
Estimation results are displayed in Table 2 . The demand parameters have the expected magnitude. The demand is quite inelastic with a price elasticity at -0.29 as found in previous studies. There is a significant revenue effect with a revenue elasticity at 0.52. Households living in Northern California tend to consume less water than in Southern California. The ratio population by footage of pipe is used as a proxy for population density. Thus, larger population density areas tend to consume less water with an elasticity equal to -0.20. The production process tends to exhibit decreasing returns to scale though they could be considered as constant. Since homogeneity is imposed, the parameter for capital is equal to 0.3249.
Rainfall has a negative impact on costs as districts with more rainfall are expected to have water sources in proximity thereby reducing costs. The case r = 1 provides the best fit with γ equal to 1.04 giving E(θ) = 0.9617 suggesting a concentration of efficient firms. These results can be used to assess whether the regulator has implemented the optimal regulation through T and R. The optimal montly access fee and the optimal rate of return should be equal on average to $19 and 0.14, respectively. Both values are somewhat larger than observed ones (see Table 1 ) with a larger range of values leading to more discrimination among firms. These results suggest that (i) the model provides a reasonable fit to the data, and (ii) the CUPC tends to be cautious in the rents given to firms.
Under complete information, the price would be about 10.7% less on average than the observed one resulting in an increase of 3% in water consumption. The monthly access fee would be also at about $4. These two factors lead to an increase in consumer surplus by 6.7% while considering a maximum consumers' willingness to pay for water at $10. The capital stock would be about 16.9% lower, while the firms' profit would be equal to zero by definition. As such, the cost of asymmetric information is quite substantial. The simulation of a price cap under asymmetric information leads to a uniform water price at about $2.8.
All the firms would be subject to the cap as their monoply prices would take larger values than this cap. This larger price would result in a reduction of expected consumption by 30% and a reduction in consumer surplus by 23%. The capital stock chosen by firms would be about 35% less as it would be not be subject to any distortion. This would result in a substantial increase in firms' profit. When considering the social welfare defined as the sum of the consumer surplus and the firms' profit, this increase in firms' profit does not, however, counterbalance the loss in consumer surplus. As such, our results suggest that the actual regulation provides a superior outcome. 
